This paper examines the impact of increased competition from deregulation on the dynamics of the U.S. banking industry. We find the link between a bank's relative performance and its subsequent market share growth strengthens significantly after deregulation as competitive reallocation effects transfer assets to better performers. The increase in the link is strongest in states that were initially more regulated and therefore likely to be less competitive, e.g., states with unit banking restrictions and high market concentrations. Exit dynamics also change in ways consistent with the disciplinary role of competition. After states deregulate, both the exit rates and the average profitability of exiting banks increase as more banks are exposed to the corporate takeover market. The net effect of these forces is a substantial reallocation of market share toward better banks. We conclude that earlier regulation of U.S. banks blunted this market mechanism and seriously hindered the competitive process.
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I. Introduction
Competition is perhaps the most fundamental idea in economics, and as firms fight for profits, the competitive paradigm makes clear dynamic predictions: strong performers should pass the market test and survive, while weak performers should shrink, exit, or sell out. This transfer of market share from under-performers to more successful firms is a critical part of the competitive process, but this stylized picture is not always the reality. Regulation, uncertainty, and other barriers to entry can protect inefficient firms, limit entry and exit, and prevent the textbook competitive shakeout. 1 In the early 1970s, restrictions on interstate banking and intrastate branching were the norm for U.S. states, effectively shielding banks from outside competition and creating many distinct banking markets. Beginning in the late 1970s, however, U.S. states began to allow interstate acquisitions and statewide branching. This deregulation created a more competitive environment by allowing banks to enter new markets and threaten incumbent banks. As a result of these regulatory changes, both the costs and prices of banking services fell (Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) ). These improvements in banking also appear to have helped small and new businesses flourish (Black and Strahan (2001) ). Moreover, states that deregulated banking enjoyed faster growth in gross state product and state income following deregulation (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) ). In this paper, we explore one source of these beneficial effects by testing how deregulation enhanced competitive dynamics in the U.S. banking industry.
Consider the correlation between bank profitability and subsequent change in market share in Figure 1 . 2 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there is little relationship. As the industry steadily deregulated during the 1980s and more institutions were put to the market test, however, the correlation strengthened considerably as above average performance in one year became significantly associated with market share gains in the following year. In the last few years, this correlation has declined. One interpretation is that early regulation blunted competitive forces and weakened the dynamic link between performance and growth. The deregulation of the 1980s then unleashed these competitive dynamics and there was a flurry of expansion for the best banks. More recently, the correlation has waned as the pent up pressures for reallocation exhausted themselves. While this 1 Winston (1998) reports that increased merger activity and large-scale exit are common results of deregulation across U.S. industries, implying that regulation can protect weak firms, while Andrade et al. (2001) find that deregulation precipitated substantial consolidation in banking in the 1990s. Jovanovic (1982) presents a theoretical model where firm uncertainty induces firms to delay exit. 2 The correlations are Spearman rank correlations between a bank's return on equity relative to the economy average and the change in a bank's share of banking assets. Results are similar when we use the bank's market share of the state's assets. See Section II for details on how the data were created.
simple comparison cannot identify deregulation as the causal factor, it is indicative of the competitive forces we analyze in this paper.
To understand the link between regulation and competitive dynamics, our empirical strategy exploits state-by-state differences in the timing of deregulation. U.S. states deregulated their banking systems (both restrictions on interstate banking and within-state branching) in piecemeal fashion; this provides an ideal mechanism for identifying the impact of deregulation. In particular, we ask: Do performance/growth relationship, exit rates, and characteristics of exiting banks systematically change after a state deregulates its banking system? The answer, in all cases, is yes.
We begin with bank-level data and examine the link between performance and subsequent market share for surviving banks. Our primary result is that relative performance -measured in terms of either profits or costs -becomes a much better predictor of future market share after deregulation.
Moreover, the link is strongest more than five years after deregulation, suggesting that some adjustment period is required for the dynamics of competition to affect market outcomes.
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The strengthening of the performance/market share link is robust across various sub-samples of our data, which provide several additional interesting results. First, the effect of branching deregulation was largest in unit banking states, which initially had the tightest restrictions and the biggest subsequent release of competitive pressures. Second, the link between market share and performance increased the most in states with high market concentration, presumably those with the least competitive environments initially. Third, branching deregulation affected significantly small banks but not large ones, while interstate banking deregulation had its greatest effect on large banks.
This makes sense because interstate banking allowed out-of-state bank holding companies (BHCs) to buy large banks previously shielded from the threat of such takeovers and most of these out-of-state acquirers have been quite large.
We then test and rule out the possibility that deregulation merely enhanced the opportunities for large and well-heeled banks to acquire weaker banks, but did not increase competitive pressure on poorly performing banks. We find the link between performance and market share increased not just for acquisition-minded banks but also for banks with below average profits and, perhaps most relevant, for banks that were losing market share. Thus, in the deregulated environment, not only did the better banks grow, but the poorly performing banks shrank, and those with the worst performance shrank the most. This is compelling evidence of a competitive shakeout after deregulation.
Our second set of results uses state-level aggregates to examine both the pace of bank exit and the characteristics of exiting banks, before and after a state deregulates. In terms of exit rates, our 3 results show a significant increase in the exit of large banks after interstate banking deregulation. On an asset-weighted basis, the number of banks that exited in a given year increased by 3.6% per year after a state removes its interstate banking restrictions. This is reasonable because large banks are typically acquired by out-of-state acquirers, who are presumably interested in entering new markets.
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Following intrastate branching deregulation, we find a significant effect on exit only for the most restrictive unit banking states. In these states, the simple (unweighted) exit rate increased after a state allowed intrastate branching, suggesting significant discipline of the small banks.
We also find that the characteristics of exiting banks changed significantly after deregulation, e.g., the relative profitability of exiting banks increased significantly after both interstate and intrastate restrictions were lifted. This reflects an increase in the exit rate of above-average performers following deregulation, while the exit rate of poor performers does not change. This finding suggests a very specific acquisition strategy: when markets are opened up by deregulation, banks tend to expand into new markets by acquiring well-run banks and then competing against the remaining poor performers.
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This indirect strategy may dominate the more direct one of buying poor performers because it avoids the problems of fighting entrenched management that may not be able (or willing) to maximize the value of the bank. 6 It also likely helps to minimize the asymmetric information problems that are particularly severe for bank assets. 7 This suggests the benefits from an open and active corporate takeover market may be difficult to find if the emphasis is placed on the particular parties to a takeover. 8 Rather, the gains accrue to the industry as a whole and consumers over time as better-run banks increase their market share.
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Taken together, these state-level results show that regulation imposed important constraints on market pressures. By reducing the breadth and power of the corporate takeover market, poor 3 Sluggish adjustment is consistent with the experience of a number of industries surveyed by Winston (1998) . 4 Rhoades (2000) reports that about two-thirds of large mergers (acquiring and target each have assets greater than $1 billion in assets) were interstate mergers. 5 This is consistent with documented acquisition strategies in U.S. manufacturing, e.g., McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) find that firms tend to acquire good businesses rather than bad ones. This is also consistent with the results of Matsusaka (1993) who found that the stock market rewarded acquirers following a "managerial synergy" approach, but not ones following a "managerial-discipline" approach. 6 Note that good managers may be entrenched as well as bad ones. 7 Asymmetric information may be particularly severe for banks because bank loans are hard to value (Diamond (1994) ). See Morgan (forthcoming) for details. In addition, the relative paucity of hostile takeovers in banking may reflect, in part, a substitution of regulatory discipline for the discipline normally coming from the market for corporate control (Prowse, 1997) . 8 Peristiani (1997) , for example, found that mergers were not beneficial to banks in terms of reducing xinefficiency. Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) review this literature.
4 performers were shielded from competition and remained in operation. After deregulation, poor performers came under increased pressure as well-run banks entered their previously shielded markets.
Moreover, we find that these dynamics generated a large and meaningful change in the control of banking assets. Prior to deregulation, for example, only about half of banking assets were held by the more profitable banks; after deregulation, better banks controlled about 70 percent of the industry.
This transfer of assets to better banks represents a clear benefit from the deregulation of the U.S.
banking industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the evidence of reallocation effects as a source of industry gains. Section III outlines some basic facts about the deregulation experience of U.S. banking. Section IV describes our data. Section V presents our empirical approach and main findings. Section VI concludes.
II. Deregulation and Dynamic Effects of Competition
The search for benefits of deregulation has been an area of active empirical research. In a survey of the literature, Winston (1998) discusses the dynamic effect of increased competition after deregulation and finds that substantial merger activity generally occurs within one decade of an industry's deregulation and that these mergers have facilitated large-scale exit of weaker firms. By increasing competitive pressures on all firms, deregulation forces inefficient firms to either improve their performance or exit the industry through merger or outright failure. These findings support the seminal work of Demsetz (1973) , who concluded that industry concentration was an endogenous response to the growth of efficient firms.
Competitive dynamics of this type have been an important part of the literature on plant-level productivity, which has quantified the impact of these reallocation effects. 10 Building on the empirical work of Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) , a consensus has formed that restructuring and reallocation of market share toward better, more efficient firms is a key driver of aggregate or industry-level productivity gains. Haltiwanger (1997) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998) , for example, attribute about half of manufacturing productivity growth from 1977 to 1987 to composition effects as output is reallocated among plants. Outside of manufacturing, Stiroh (2000a) reports that reallocation of assets to above-average commercial banks helped maintain industry profits, particularly in periods when the industry did poorly; French and Mobley (2000) find that relatively efficient 5 hospitals grew more quickly than their less efficient peers. The common conclusion is that reallocation of market share among heterogeneous firms or plants is an important contributor to the overall success and structure of an industry.
Large and important reallocation effects, however, are clearly predicated on the ability of resources and market share to flow easily and at low cost between heterogeneous producers. As noted by Winston (1998) , regulation is one friction that restricts this process. It has been difficult, however, to quantify the impact of deregulation on reallocation effects. In one detailed study, Olley and Pakes (1996) find that productivity growth accelerated after deregulation of the U.S. telecommunications industry as capital was reallocated toward more productive plants. Analysis of a single industry, however, makes identification of the regulatory impact difficult due to a limited number of deregulation episodes.
The unique history of banking deregulation, described in the following section, allows us resolve this identification problem. By treating each state as a unique banking market, we can exploit the information from many deregulation episodes across similar environments to clearly identify the impact. This approach has been used by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) to show that banking deregulation increased state-level growth and by Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) to show that deregulation increased efficiency. We use it here to gauge the impact on dynamic reallocation effects.
To do so, we test if the link between performance and market share strengthened following deregulation. If it did, this provides direct evidence that regulation restricted the positive effects of competitive reallocations.
There are several ways for competitive reallocation effects to raise the performance of an industry, and our second goal is to examine how this process evolves in U.S. banking. One possibility is that better, more efficient firms simply grow faster than others and gain market share, which directly raises average performance (Demsetz (1973) ). A second is that some firms improve their relative performance while also growing in size. This explanation is consistent with the manufacturing literature, e.g., Haltiwanger (1997) reports a large aggregate impact from the positive correlation of productivity growth and size growth in U.S. manufacturing plants. Third, entry and exit can be key as output is reallocated away from failing firms and toward more successful firms, e.g., Jensen, McGuckin, and Stiroh (2001) find that exiting manufacturing plants have low productivity levels, but that entrants with modern technology show higher productivity than entrants from earlier cohorts.
The banking industry is characterized by rapid consolidation, so we focus our attention on distinguishing between alternative scenarios that deal primarily with expansion and exit. In one case, successful banks can expand into new markets through acquisitions of poor performers, and then 6 improve or replace existing management to raise performance. This process directly reallocates assets toward better banks and raises industry performance. Alternatively, above-average firms could enter new markets by buying other well-run incumbents. Because the acquirer and target may be equally successful, this first step does not directly create a reallocation effect. As the competitive process plays out, however, relatively weak incumbents could be forced from the market by the stronger acquirer with additional resources, e.g., a strong deposit base or lower-cost access to funds from the capital markets. This would lead the weak incumbent to lose market share, or be forced to improve by disciplinary pressures. We sort out these two alternatives in detail in our empirical work.
Note that our empirical work focuses on surviving banks and exiting banks, but we do not investigate the impact of deregulation on de novo entry. Amel and Liang (1992) find that banking deregulation significantly increased new branch creation, but had little effect on de novo bank formation. More recently, Berger et al. (2000) examine the dynamics of entry across Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and non-MSA counties and conclude that entry was more common in markets where M&A activity occurred and in the unit-banking states. This is consistent with our hypotheses about competitive reallocations because M&As and unit banking restrictions can both reduce competition, thus making entry a more attractive option. Moreover, DeYoung and Hasan (1998) report that de novo entrants are quite small and typically take nine years to reach average efficiency levels, so they would not have a quantitatively important influence the reallocation process.
III. A Brief History of Bank Regulation
The U.S. banking industry has a long history of regulation, and a more recent history of deregulation. Restrictions on banks' ability to expand within a state through branching were initially imposed by the states in the nineteenth century.
11
Small and inefficient banks supported these restrictions because they prevented competition with other banks. (Kroszner and Strahan (1999) , which increased public awareness of the advantages of large, well-diversified banks (Kane (1996) ).
12 Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1996) show, for instance, that states with many weakly capitalized small banks supported the 1927 McFadden Act, which gave states the authority to regulate national banks' branching powers.
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In most cases, the dates selected reflect the time at which the state finished the branching deregulation process. See Amel (1993) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) for details. 14 This pattern is consistent with a political-economy interpretation of the deregulatory process. By forcing potential entrants to buy their way into new markets, branching by M&A allows incumbent firms to collect some of the rents generated by the restrictions on entry. For further evidence, see Kroszner and Strahan (1999) . Kroszner and Strahan (1999) suggest that the emergence of new technologies in both deposit taking and lending may have encouraged the elimination of geographic barriers by changing the nature of banking markets. For instance, the introduction of the automated teller machine in the late 1970s and the development of money market mutual funds increased competitiveness in deposit markets. At the same time, new information technologies diminished the value of the specialized knowledge that long-established local bankers might have had about the risks of borrowers in the community. These changes enhanced the ability of banks to compete in more distant markets. As a result, protected banks' incentive to defend restrictions on branching and interstate banking has diminished over time, while expansion-minded banks' desire to see the restrictions fall has increased.
IV. Data
Our empirical work requires two primary pieces of data -bank performance data, and measures of state regulations. We briefly discuss each in turn.
(i) Bank Performance Data
There are several possible levels of aggregation that could be useful for this type of analysis. One could use bank-level data and treat each individually chartered bank as a separate entity.
Alternatively, one could use consolidated data for the bank holding company (BHC), which aggregates all bank and non-bank subsidiaries. Neither is exactly appropriate for our analysis. Banklevel data are too narrow and would miss the effects of common ownership across different bank subsidiaries within a particular BHC. We want to focus on changes in the control of banking assets, so we need to take care not to confuse internal changes, e.g., the combination of two subsidiaries owned by the same holding company, with true changes in control stemming from the competitive dynamics of entry, acquisition, and growth. Complete holding company data, on the other hand, is not ideal because it ignores the restrictions that effectively create segmented banking markets at the state-level.
BHC data would also introduce additional variation from non-bank subsidiaries that are subject to different regulatory constraints.
Our solution is to create intermediate data that recognize both the holding company structure and the state restrictions. To do this, we aggregate all commercial bank subsidiaries of a particular BHC that operate in the same state into a single bank/state observation. By accounting for consolidation under a holding company, these observations consistently reflect a given institution's 9 control over a state's banking market, while still allowing us to test for the effects of state restrictions on expansion. 15 An important caveat is that these bank/state observations lose meaning after 1994. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 allowed bank holding companies to acquire a bank in any state after September 29, 1995 and permitted mergers between banks in different states as of June 1, 1997, which effectively allowed nationwide branch networks.
The 1994 Riegle-Neal Act also gave states the right to adopt an earlier starting date for interstate mergers, however, and about half of the states did so (Spong (2000) A second issue is the measure of performance. The manufacturing literature typically uses productivity, either labor or total factor, as its primary indicator. We do not have good measures of productivity, so we use accounting profits, measured as the return on owners equity (ROE), or costs as our primary measures of performance. Unlike productivity, profits do not exhibit a trend because prices tend to fall with costs as savings are passed onto consumers. 16 Costs are also not directly comparable to productivity because they fluctuate more with input prices. 
V. Empirical Results
We examine both bank-level data and state-level aggregates to understand the evolving dynamics of competition in U.S. banking. As noted above, we test the extent to which restrictions on bank expansion retarded the evolution of the industry toward lower-cost, higher-profit firms.
We first use bank-level data to examine how the relationship between performance, defined in three ways, and market share changes after deregulation. This bank-level comparison focuses only on surviving banks because we use bank performance measures from the preceding year. While this might seem to limit the applicability of the results, virtually all of the assets of exiting banks remain in the analysis because exit typically occurs through acquisition rather than through liquidation. 20 That is, one of the most important ways that well-run banks can gain market share is by buying other banks.
For our purposes, these acquisitions are considered exit from the perspective of the target bank.
We then use aggregated state-level data to consider the impact of deregulation on exit patterns and examine the characteristics of the exiting banks. Finally, we evaluate the aggregate impact of this dynamic process using state-level data by asking how much of the market the better-run banks collectively hold, and examine how this changes following deregulation. We report results from each part of the analysis in the following subsections. Figure 1 shows that the correlation between relative performance and changes in market share steadily increased during the 1980s. We now test formally whether this change can be attributed to branching and interstate banking deregulation. Because states deregulated at different points in time, this type of econometric analysis allows us to identify the direct impact of deregulation. To do this, we model each bank's share of state assets as a function of its relative performance in the preceding year and then test whether the link between current market share and lagged performance becomes stronger after states relax their restrictions on branching and interstate banking.
(i) Bank-Level Performance and Market Share
12 We construct a bank-level panel dataset to compare market share to past performance. Each bank's market share is observed at the end of each year in which it operates from 1976 to 1994. Our primary performance measure is the bank's profit rate relative to its peers. In particular, we define the normalized return on equity (NROE) as the bank's ROE less the mean ROE for all banks in the same state and year, divided by the standard deviation of ROE for those banks.
We focus on ROE because it provides a conceptually sound measure of a bank's average profit rate, i.e., it represents the return to the owners' equity investment in the bank. Return on assets (ROA) is often used to assess bank profitability, but this measure is only useful when comparing banks that have similar equity to assets ratios. The difficulty with ROA is that it does not represent the return on the bank's assets because the numerator, the bank's earnings, is computed net of the interest paid on liabilities. 21 For example, consider two banks offering their owners the same return on their investment; that is, two banks with the same ROE. The bank with the lower equity to assets ratio will have a lower ROA because its earnings will be reduced by additional interest expenses paid to depositors and other creditors. The high ROA bank in this example is not more profitable because its additional earnings are necessary to compensate the owners for their greater investment in the bank.
Because financial leverage does in fact vary considerably across our sample, however, we control for these differences by including the equity to assets ratio, again normalized to the state average, as an explanatory variable in our regressions.
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To test whether lagged performance is related to market share and whether this link becomes stronger after deregulation, we estimate variations of the following equation:
(1) 21 The standard measure of return on assets for non-financial companies is the ratio of earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), divided by total assets. This ratio is typically not used in banking because banks earn a return on both the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet. 22 Because ROE has some very large positive and negative outliers, we truncate the variable at the 1 st and 99 th percentile of its distribution. Results are similar when we dropped outliers above +50% or below -50%.
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NKA i,t-1 is the normalized equity to assets ratio, i α is a bank fixed effect, and t α is a year fixed effect all where i is the bank, j is the state, and t is the year.
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Note that because the regression includes a bank-level fixed effect, 3 β measures the relationship between deviations in lagged relative performance from its mean and deviations in current market shares from its mean. 1 β and 2 β are the parameters of particular interest because they indicate how the performance/market share link changes after each kind of deregulation.
As robustness checks, we also estimate Equation 1 with two alternative performance measures. The first alternative is an indicator equal to one for banks with lagged ROE above the median of their peers (other banks in the same state). The advantage of this specification is that it is resistant to outliers, so we no longer need to truncate the data and drop banks with very high or very low ROE. The second performance indicator is based on relative efficiency. This measure is set to one for banks with below-median costs, where costs are measured as the ratio of non-interest expenses to total operating income. 24 This cost-based alternative has the advantage of being less subject to demand shocks that may increase or decrease a bank's ROE, thereby potentially introducing noise into the ROE measure of bank quality. In addition, relative costs are a better measure of improved efficiency because we don't have to worry about output price changes as savings are passed on to consumers.
(a) Primary Bank-Level Results Table 2 reports the primary results for the three performance measures in Columns 1 to 3.
With one exception, the regressions show that the link between lagged performance and market share became significantly stronger after both branching and interstate banking deregulation. 25 For example, a one-standard deviation rise in ROE (relative to state peers) leads to a gain in market share of about 0.05 percentage points after both branching and interstate banking are allowed; in contrast, there is no significant effect of relative profitability on market share in the regulated period. 26 Banks that had 14 above-median ROE in the deregulated period gained 0.078 percent of the market over the subsequent year, compared to only 0.006 in the regulated period.
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We conclude that banks' relative performance is more strongly linked to subsequent market share gains in deregulated environments. In the regulated periods, these healthy dynamics are impeded by artificial constraints. While the coefficients on lagged performance in the regulated period are statistically significant in two of the regressions, they are quantitatively small and there is a clear strengthening of the market share/performance link after deregulation in all cases.
These estimates also point to a consistently negative coefficient on the equity to assets ratio.
Because large banks tend to operate with greater leverage, this could simply be picking up a size effect. Although with fixed effects in the regression, this is not likely to be the full story.
Alternatively, it could represent different operating strategies across banks as aggressive banks are more inclined to have both higher leverage and to expand more rapidly.
How long does it takes for deregulation to strengthen this link between performance and market share? In Column 4 of Table 2 , we explore the timing of changes in the performance/market share link. 28 We do this be adding two indicator variables to Equation (1) during the first five years, while its long-run impact equals 0.034.
The last two columns of To test for differences between concentrated and unconcentrated markets, the full set of explanatory variables from Equation (1) 31 We also considered using a concentration measure based on each bank's share of total assets in the state. This approach is somewhat less satisfying, however, because assets are only measurable at the bank level and therefore cannot be allocated to individual local markets. Nevertheless, the asset-based HHI is consistently highly correlated across states with the deposit-based HHI, with a correlation ranging from a low of 0. 
CONC
) and the δ are the differential effect for the concentrated state/year observations.
Results are reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 , where Column 1 presents the β coefficients for the unconcentrated markets and Column 2 presents the δ coefficients, which are the difference in the coefficient for the concentrated states. In the states with relatively unconcentrated markets, the performance link increases by 0.014 following branching and by 0.025 following interstate banking (Column 1). In states with concentrated banking markets, however, the coefficient on lagged performance increases by 0.029 following branching deregulation and by 0.038 following interstate banking (Column 1 plus Column 2). For both branching and interstate banking, the larger increase in the performance/market share relationship in concentrated states is statistically significant.
This implies that deregulation has the impact on competitive dynamics in the most concentrated banking markets.
(c) Robustness Tests: Do Better Banks Really Gain Following Deregulation?
The previous results show that the link between bank performance and market share became stronger after deregulation, suggesting that relaxed constraints on bank growth improves the average quality of the banking system as better banks gain control of the market over time. An alternative interpretation, however, is that this change reflects nothing more than increased M&A activity after deregulation that is unrelated to bank quality. One possibility, for example, is that banks with more 32 We split the sample at 1800 for two reasons. First, the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines consider markets with HHI above 1800 to be concentrated and potentially subject to market power for antitrust purposes. Second, the median value for the HHI across states in our sample is slightly less than 1800. 33 An alternative specification with the continuous HHI interacted yields similar conclusions. Results are available from the authors upon request.
access to resources -large banks, banks with high levels of capital, or banks flush with cash -simply acquire assets without any particular ability to manage those assets better than competing banks.
Perhaps acquirers are simply luckier than other banks. If true, this idea could explain our results, but undermine our interpretation.
To address this issue, we re-estimate our basic regression in Equation (1) for sub-samples of banks that are least likely to be able to acquire other banks. If the performance/market share link strengthens for these banks, then we can conclude that the poor performing banks are indeed facing more competitive pressure after deregulation. To do this, we split our sample in three ways. First, we used size as the criterion and created sub-samples of "small" banks (share of state assets below 1%)
and "large" banks (share of state assets above 1%) to test whether the performance/market share link became stronger for relatively small banks, which are less likely to be acquirers. 34 Second, we split the data based on the availability of cash to a bank by identifying the "low ROE" banks (ROE below the state/year median) and the "high ROE" banks (ROE above the state/year median). Again, the question is whether poor performers became subject to increased pressure after deregulation. Finally, we split the data based on observed growth and created sub-samples of "shrinkers" (banks with a declining market share over the two periods) and "growers" (banks with increased market share over the two periods) to see if performance and market share are linked for those banks losing market share.
35 Table 4 reports the result. We find that the performance/market share link increases for both large and small banks (Columns 1 and 2). For small banks, the link increases by 0.005 percentage points after branching and by 0.006 after interstate banking deregulation. Thus, a small bank with ROE one standard deviation above the mean would gain 0.011 percentage points more market share after deregulation than before. For large banks, we find that the performance link increased only after interstate banking deregulation. The coefficient suggests that a large bank with ROE one standard deviation above average would gain 0.236 percentage points of the market, which is a much larger increase than the corresponding increase for small banks (statistically significant at the 1% level).
This increased correlation between performance and market share for both large and small banks also sheds light on the question of scale economies. For example, a static view of the production process might argue that the relationship between market share and performance reflects basic characteristics of the production technology, i.e., scale economies, scope economies, or market power.
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Our results suggest a more dynamic explanation where increased size is the result of successful performance as better firms grow at the expense of their weaker competitors. This implies some caution when interpreting the economies of scale literature, which essentially takes size as exogenous and ignores the dynamic link.
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 , we report the results estimated for banks with low ROE and high ROE banks, and Columns 5 and 6 report the results for banks that gained market share and banks that lost share. We find that the performance/market share link increased after both forms of deregulation for all sub-samples of banks. For example, after both branching and interstate deregulation, a bank that is losing market share lost about 0.031 percentage points for every standard deviation that its ROE was below its peers (Column 5) while a bank that is gaining market share added 0.058 percentage points (Column 6).
These results suggest that the competitive pressures from deregulation led to meaningful reallocations of market share to the better performing institutions. Not only did banks with high ROE gain market share through M&A, but banks with low ROE lost market share. Moreover, within the set of banks that lost market share, those with lowest ROE lost the most. Thus, by increasing pressure on under-performing banks and allowing the reallocation of assets towards stronger performers, this process contributed to the improved performance of the U.S. banking industry.
(ii) Deregulation and State-Level Exit Trends
The previous analysis examined the disciplinary pressures on surviving banks. We now move our focus to banks that exit the industry. Before continuing, it is worth emphasizing that we define exit quite broadly to incorporate not just failure or liquidation of bank assets, but also changes in ownership. Therefore, we are concentrating on the exit of a firm as a separate entity, rather than the exit of assets per se. Bank exit is typically not associated with the elimination of physical assets such as branches or financial assets such as loans, but rather these assets are simply transferred to the acquiring institution.
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For example, branching deregulation allows banks to enter new markets within the state by buying existing banks, or branches of exiting banks, and folding them into their current operation as 35 Note that we do not test whether the effects are the same across the different sub-samples as we did in the test of concentrated markets. In terms of concentration, we were specifically interested in the question of whether the effects differed. Here, we are interested in the question of whether these effects exist for each type of bank. 36 Hughes and Mester (1999) find scale economies for large U.S. banks, although earlier studies typically did not. 37 Of course, banks with large asset quality problems can see the market value of their loans decline substantially. Failed banks, however, are relatively small fraction of bank exit in our sample. the target's offices are converted into branches. This strategy avoids the cost of operating a multibank holding company within a state and adds services to the customer in the form of convenience.
Similarly, interstate banking removes the prohibition on out-of-state bank holding company's ability to own any assets in a state. Because both forms of deregulation make it much easier for banks to be acquired, we expect exit, which we define broadly as a change in the ownership of bank assets, to rise.
We construct two measures of overall exit: the percentage of banks in a state that exit during the year and the market share of those exiting banks. The second measure is essentially an asset- (4) The results, reported in Table 5 , suggest that branching deregulation had little impact on the exit rate in states that began with limited branching. For unit banking states, however, we find an increase in the simple exit rate of a little more than one percentage point per year (1.412-0.325). 38 The increase in the weighted exit rate, however, is never statistically significant following branching deregulation. These results are sensible. Branching deregulation has a bigger effect on the exit behavior of small banks. This is consistent with the political economy of branching deregulation in which small banks fought to maintain restrictions on branching while large banks fought to have them removed (Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1995) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999) ).
When we focus on interstate banking deregulation, we find that the weighted exit rate increased by more than three percentage points per year, while the simple exit rate does not significantly change. Again this is reasonable; very large banks are more likely to be acquired and exit once large out-of-state banking companies are allowed to enter and acquire them. In contrast to branching deregulation, interstate banking seems to affect large banks more than small ones.
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These results show that small banks in unit banking states exited more frequently after branching deregulation, while large banks exited more frequently after interstate banking was allowed.
We now turn to changes in the characteristics of exiting banks following each deregulation and examine the average relative profits and the average market share for all exiting banks in a given year.
To better understand the relative performance and size of exiting banks, we test whether these characteristics changed significantly after branching and interstate banking deregulation using a regression similar to Equation (4).
(b) Deregulation and the Composition of Exiting Banks Table 6 reports regressions of the change in relative profits and market share on the state-level deregulation dummy variables. That is, we use the same independent variables as in Equation (4), but the independent variable is now either relative profitability or average size.
The estimates indicate that profitability (measured by relative ROE) and average size (measured by market share) of exiters both rise following deregulation. For example, after both types of deregulation, the average exiter's relative profits increased by 0.74 standard deviations. This translates into an increase in the ROE of about 6.5 percentage points. While the average exiter consistently underperformed, this performance gap was much greater prior to deregulation. We return to this issue shortly. Exiting banks also became significantly larger after interstate banking was allowed, but there is no change after branching; the average market share of an exiting bank increased by about 0.8 percentage points.
Why did the relative performance of exiting banks improve after deregulation? One explanation is that in a regulated environment only the very worst performers are subject to market discipline, while marginal performers were relatively insulated and unencumbered. After deregulation, market forces might increase the pressures on these marginal banks so that they, along with the very worst performers, became more likely to exit. Alternatively, we know that deregulation reduced barriers to entry into new markets. If expansion-minded banks prefer to enter new markets by buying relatively healthy banks, then the average performance of exiters would rise following deregulation. Banks may prefer to buy healthy banks to avoid the difficulties of differentiating between poorly run banks with solid fundamentals (attractive targets) from thoroughly bad banks with little strength on the balance sheet (unattractive targets). The information problems associated with financial assets may make this distinction particularly difficult for banks.
To sort out these competing explanations, we looked at the exit rates of above and below median performers separately. Again, we use the same specification as in Equation (4), but the dependent variable is one of several exit rates. The "good exit rate" equals the share of banks with above-median ROE (relative to all banks in the state) at the end of year t that exit during year t+1; the "bad exit rate" equals the share of banks with below-median ROE at the end of year t that exit during year t+1. We use both an unweighted and an asset-weighted version.
The results in Table 7 clearly show that the increase in the average ROE of exiters occurs because more good banks exit after deregulation. This is consistent with evidence from manufacturing plants, e.g., McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) find that plants with high productivity are most likely to experience ownership change. In contrast, there is no change in the bad exit rate after deregulation.
Our conclusion holds for both branching and interstate banking deregulation. For example, the simple exit rate for good banks rises by about 3 percentage points per year after both forms of deregulation. As before, when we weight the results by market share, we find increased exit by the good banks only after interstate banking. Also consistent with our earlier findings, the effects appear larger when unit banking states permit branching than when limited branching states do.
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These results show that banking deregulation spurred an increase in consolidation and bank exit. After states opened up their markets to increased competition, both the number and the market share of exiting banks increased significantly. We also find that exiting banks, on average, were better after deregulation, indicating that acquiring banks sought entry into new market by purchasing relatively healthy incumbents. This result may help to explain why some studies, e.g., Rhoades (1993) and Peristiani (1997) , have found little increase in efficiency after bank mergers. If banks are acquiring relatively successful targets, then gains may be from the entry into new market and market share increases, rather than through improved performance of the combined entity. Moreover, industry gains such as lower costs will result from increased competitive pressure on unsuccessful incumbents, which now face with bigger, better competitors, rather than the direct improvement from the consolidation itself.
(iii) The Overall Impact of Deregulation
The final part of our analysis addresses the question of the overall effectiveness of these competitive dynamics. That is, as above-average firms grow and poorly performing firms exit, do better firms really come to dominate markets? Our bottom line answer is yes. Consider the change in the market share of banks with above-median ROE for five sets of states: (1) states that permitted branching throughout our sample period; (2) states that limited branching; (3) states the permitted branching but began the period as limited branching states; (4) unit banking states; and, (5) states the 39 The results are robust to using ROA as the measure of performance.
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permitted branching but began the period as unit-banking states. 40 Figure 2 compares the longstanding branching states with those that began with only unit banking, and Figure 3 compares the longstanding branching states with the limited branching states.
These figures clearly show a large reallocation of market share to banks with above-median ROE after deregulation. In states that allowed branching throughout the period, the better banks consistently hold 60 to 70 percent of a state's assets and have dominated in these longstanding branching states over the past 20 years. In contrast, in states that limited branching or prohibited it altogether, better banks appear constrained; they held only about half of the assets in the unit banking states and 55 to 60 percent in the limited branching states during the regulated period. Consistent with our econometric work, the former unit banking states seemed to gain most from deregulation.
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In all types of states, better banks held 60 to 70 percent of the market by the end of the period.
VI. Conclusions
Do open markets allow the best firms to prosper? In manufacturing, Haltiwanger (1997) shows that capacity seems to gravitate toward high productivity plants, while Olley and Pakes (1996) show that regulation hindered this process in the telecommunications industry. Our results for the U.S. banking industry show a similar phenomenon. We find that when markets become more open, the link between performance and market share increases significantly. Over time, these competitive dynamics reallocated control of the banking industry toward the better-run banks.
We conclude that regulations imposed an important constraint on competitive reallocation effects in the U.S. banking industry. The steady market share of good banks in deregulating states and the apparent convergence of market share across all states provides strong support for our contention that interstate banking and intrastate branching deregulation were a causal factor behind this reallocation. Because the U.S. banking industry experienced other regulatory change that affected all states equally, e.g., the removal of Regulation Q in 1986, the state-by-state variation provides the crucial identification. By unleashing competitive pressures, deregulation of banking markets successfully transferred a substantial portion of banking assets from low profit to high profit banks and contributed to the increased profitability of the industry as a whole. 35 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Year
Rank Correlation
Note: Plot of the Spearman rank correlation for each year between a bank's ROE in year t-1 (normalized relative to the economy average), and the change in the economy-wide share of the bank's assets from year t-1 to t . Correlations only include banks that survive for two adjecent years. Amel (1993) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999 
Relative Profits Alternative Performance Measures
Results are from the following fixed effect regression:
where θ i,t is bank i 's share in the assets of state j in year t . Three different measures of performance, PERF i,t-1 , are used as independent variables; all are lagged values. Relative profits is the difference between a bank's ROE and the mean ROE for other banks located in the same state/year, divided by the standard deviation of ROE across banks in the same state/year. For this measure, we trim ROE at the 1st and 99th percentile. Two indicator variables are also used: above median ROE (=1 for banks with ROE greater than the median for all banks operating in the same state/year, =0 otherwise) and above median efficiency (=1 for banks with a ratio of non-interest expense to total operating income below the median for all banks operating in the same state/year, =0 otherwise).
Bank fixed effects and time effects are included. where Exit Rate j,t is either the good exit rate (the ratio of the number of good banks that exit to the total number of good banks in state j in year t , where a good bank is defined as one with profits above the median for the state/year) or the bad exit rate (the ratio of the number of bad banks that exit to the total number of bad banks in state j in year t , where a bad bank is defined as one with profits below the median for the state year). Weighted exit rates weight the exiting banks by their share of state assets. Dependent variables are a dummy variable for state j in year t for branching deregulation (BRANCH j,t =1 if branching is allowed, =0 otherwise), a dummy variable for interstate banking deregulation (INTER j,t =1 if interstate banking is allowed, =0 otherwise), and an interaction between the branching deregulation dummy and a dummy variable for whether the state began with unit banking restrictions (UNIT j =1 if unit banking restriction, =0 otherwise).
State fixed effects and time effects are included. The within R 2 measures the percentage of variance explained by the regressors after the variance explained by the fixed effects is removed. The sample includes all states except Delaware and South Dakota from 1976 to 1994. Standard errors appear below coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
